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Abstract
Previous research has shown that people exhibit a sample size bias when judging the average of a set of
stimuli on a single dimension. The more stimuli there are in the set, the greater people judge the average
to be. This effect has been demonstrated reliably for judgments of the average likelihood that groups of
people will experience negative, positive, and neutral events (Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006)
and also for estimates of the mean of sets of numbers (Smith & Price, 2010). The present research focuses
on whether this effect is observed for judgments of average on a perceptual dimension. In 5 experiments
we show that people’s judgments of the average size of the squares in a set increase as the number of
squares in the set increases. This effect occurs regardless of whether the squares in each set are presented
simultaneously or sequentially; whether the squares in each set are different sizes or all the same size;
and whether the response is a rating of size, an estimate of area, or a comparative judgment. These results
are consistent with a priming account of the sample size bias, in which the sample size activates a
representation of magnitude that directly biases the judgment of average.
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People make judgments about averages in many different con- 
texts and for many different purposes. For example, a teacher 
might judge the average mathematical ability of her students in 
deciding how best to teach them. Or a hospital patient might judge 
the average number of headaches he gets per month in response to 
a physician’s question. Or a football coach might judge the average 
size or speed of an opposing defense in deciding what plays to call. 
Although a long line of psychological research on judgments of 
averages has shown that they tend to be accurate (Alvarez, 2011; 
Peterson & Beach, 1967), we have recently found that they also 
exhibit a curious bias. Specifically, they tend to increase as a 
function of the sample size. We have observed this sample size 
bias in judgments of average risk and likelihood for groups of 
people (Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006) and also in 
estimates of the mean of sets of numbers (Smith & Price, 2010). In 
the present studies, we extend this basic result to judgments of 
averages on a perceptual dimension of a stimulus—the size of 
squares—and test several possible moderators of the effect. As in 
our previous research, we find not only that people exhibit the 
sample size bias but also that it is quite robust across a wide variety 
of conditions. We argue further that the robustness of the sample 
size bias across stimuli, stimulus presentation modes, dimensions 
of judgment, and response formats suggests that it is the result of 
a very basic and general cognitive process—most likely a form of 
priming. This, in turn, suggests possible connections among 
conceptually similar phenomena in the literatures on judgment 
and decision making and quantitative cognition and perception 
more generally. 
The Sample Size Bias Phenomenon 
The original impetus for studying the sample size bias was the 
social judgment phenomenon of unrealistic optimism. People 
generally judge themselves to be at lower risk than their peers 
for experiencing negative life events like developing cancer, 
being hurt in an accident, or getting divorced (e.g., Weinstein, 
1980, 1987). In much of this research, however, the distinction 
between self and peers is confounded with sample size. 
Judgments about oneself are judgments about a small sample 
and judgments about one’s peers are judgments about a large 
sample. Our goal was to eliminate this confound and study the 
effect of sample size on risk judgments directly. In one study, 
participants read a series of descriptions of the employees at 
fictional companies in terms of their risk factors for having a 
heart attack (Price, 2001). After reading descriptions of one, 
five, or nine employees at each company, participants judged the 
heart-attack risk of the typical employee at that company. As 
hypothesized, these risk judgments increased as a function of 
the number of employees. We then generalized this result in a 
number of ways in a series of follow-up studies (Price et al., 
2006). For example, participants saw photo- graphs of groups of 
five, 10, and 15 peers and judged the likelihood that the 
average group member would experience various negative, 
neutral, and positive events. Again, as hypothesized, these 
likelihood judgments increased as a function of the number of 
people in the group. In the final study, the stimuli were groups of 
stick figures, the judgment was of their average height, and 
again a sample size bias was observed. 
These results were intriguing given that earlier research on 
judgments of averages—primarily using numbers as stimuli— had 
 
 
found such judgments to be quite accurate across a wide range of 
conditions (e.g., Anderson, 1964; Beach & Swenson, 1966; Levin, 
1975; Spencer, 1961, 1963). Nothing like a sample size bias had 
ever been reported. (See Peterson & Beach, 1967, for a classic 
review of this work.) It seemed possible, therefore, that the sample 
size bias we had observed depended on our use of ambiguous 
concepts such as “risk,” “likelihood,” and the “average person.” 
For this reason, we tested for the sample size bias by having people 
quickly estimate the means of samples of numbers—a relatively 
unambiguous task (Smith & Price, 2010). On each trial, 
participants saw samples of five, 10, 15, or 20 numbers with means 
of 20, 30, or 40. In one study, the numbers in each sample were 
presented simultaneously and in another they were presented 
sequentially. Although participants’ estimates tracked the 
objective means fairly well— consistent with previous research 
and with the idea that participants correctly interpreted their 
task—there was also a clear sample size bias that accounted for 
approximately 10% of the variance in their estimates. This was 




One of the most notable features of the sample size bias has 
been its robustness across variations in the stimuli, the mode of 
stimulus presentation, the dimension of judgment, and the 
response scale. This is important because it casts doubt on 
many intuitively plausible theories that can explain it under 
some conditions but not others. For example, the sample size 
bias for risk judgments might be the result of a 
misunderstanding. Although participants are supposed to judge 
the average risk that the people in a group will experience a 
negative event, they might misunderstand their task as one of 
judging the risk that at least one person in the group will 
experience it. However, such misunderstandings seem much less 
likely for estimates of the average height of sets of stick figures or 
the mean of sets of numbers. As another example, the sample size 
bias might occur because people selectively attend to the most 
extreme individual stimuli (e.g., the riskiest looking people or 
the greatest numbers) or weight extreme stimuli more heavily 
in making their judgments. However, selective attention and 
weighting do not apply as neatly when the stimulus individuals are 
identical stick figures so that there are no extreme individuals 
(Price et al., 2006). As a final example, the anchoring-and- 
adjustment heuristic (Epley & Gilovich, 2004) might underlie the 
sample size bias. Specifically, people might use the sample size as 
a starting point for their judgment, and insufficiently adjust away 
from that anchor such that larger samples result in greater 
judgments. This explanation seems plausible when both the sample 
size and judgment of average are on the same order of 
magnitude but not when they are on different orders of 
magnitude—as when in one study sample sizes ranged from 1 
to 15 but judgments were made on a 0-to-100 risk scale (Price 
et al., 2006). 
We have also suggested that the robustness of the sample size 
bias implicates a very basic and general cognitive process—most 
likely a priming effect of sample size on judgments of averages 
that is independent of any conscious attempt to take the sample 
size into account (Smith & Price, 2010). There are two lines of 
evidence that give additional support to this interpretation. One is 
that there exist several examples of phenomena in which an 
irrelevant stimulus numerosity or frequency affects a quantitative 
judgment. For example, Friedenberg and Limratana (2005) 
presented participants with displays consisting of several distinct 
clusters of equal numbers of dots. They found that judgments of 
the number of dots in a cluster were affected by the number of 
clusters and also that judgments of the number of clusters were 
affected by the number of dots in a cluster. Similarly, Pelham, 
Sumarta, and Myaskovsky (1994) found that the number of distinct 
elements in a stimulus affected a variety of quantitative judgments. 
For example, the number of wedges that a circle was divided into 
affected people’s judgments of the total area of the circle. And 
Dormal and Pesenti (2007) have shown that the number of spots in 
each of two horizontal arrays affects people’s ability to compare 
those two arrays in terms of their physical length. Specifically, if 
the longer array contains more spots, people make their 
comparisons faster and more accurately. But if the longer array 
contains fewer spots, people make their comparisons slower and 
less accurately. These researchers have also shown a similar 
effect of the number of spots in temporal sequences on people’s 
ability to compare those two sequences in terms of their duration 
(Dormal, Seron, & Pesenti, 2006). In all of these examples, the 
number of stimuli in a set—whether the stimuli are distributed 
spatially or temporally— biased people’s judgments of another 
quantity. Furthermore, these effects seem unlikely to be mediated 
by processes like miscommunication, selective attention, or 
anchoring and in- sufficient adjustment. 
The second line of evidence comes from research on the 
cognitive neuroscience of quantitative cognition and perception. 
Specifically, there is considerable research showing that a 
variety of quantitative stimuli—including Arabic numerals, 
number words, sets of dots, and sequences of tones—activate 
a modality- independent representation of quantity or magnitude 
in the intra- parietal sulci (IPS; Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 
2009; Dehaene, 2011; Dormal & Pesenti, 2009; Walsh, 2003; 
but see Matthews, Stewart, & Wearden, 2011, for an alternative 
interpretation). This same area is also involved in quantitative 
comparisons and simple computations (e.g., Chochon, Cohen, 
Van De Moortele, & De- haene, 1999; Dehaene, 2011). Dormal 
and Pesenti (2009) showed that both stimulus numerosity and 
stimulus length independently activate the IPS and suggested that 
this neural overlap might explain the effect of numerosity on 
judgments of length (among many conceptually similar effects). 
Thus, the key elements of a direct priming account of the 
sample size bias—that sample size activates a representation of 
quantity or magnitude, which in turn affects other quantitative 
judgments—are supported by research from other perspectives. 
 
Judgments of Perceptual Averages 
With this background, we decided to study the sample size bias 
for judgments of averages on a perceptual dimension: the size of 
squares. The primary reason is that it is not immediately clear that 
the sample size bias will generalize to such judgments. As with the 
early research on number averaging, research on perceptual aver- 
aging has shown it to be quite accurate across a wide range of 
conditions and nothing like a sample size bias has ever been 
reported or even suggested (see Alvarez, 2011, for a review). For 
example, Ariely (2001) conducted a study in which, on each trial, 
participants saw a sample of spots of varying sizes followed by a 
single test spot and then judged whether the test spot was larger or 
 
 
smaller than the average size of the spots in the sample. With 
discrimination thresholds roughly in the range of 5 to 10%, he 
concluded that “the mean size of sets was known quite precisely” 
(Ariely, 2001, p. 160). Similar results have been reported by other 
researchers for judgments of average size (Chong & Treisman, 
2005), and for other perceptual dimensions including brightness 
(Bauer, 2009), orientation (Parkes, Lund, Angelucci, Solomon, & 
Morgan, 2001), motion (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992), and location 
(Alvarez & Oliva, 2008). Perceptual averaging also seems to occur at 
very short exposure times and does not require focal attention to any 
of the individual stimuli in the sample (e.g., Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 
2001; Parkes et al., 2001). These observations have suggested to some 
researchers the possibility of specific neural circuits that are 
responsible for the automatic computation of perceptual averages 
(e.g., Chong & Treisman, 2005). Thus, judgments of perceptual 
averages might not be open to the effects of misunderstanding, 
selective attention, anchoring and adjustment, or other processes that 
could explain the sample size bias for judgments of conceptual 
averages. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to expect 
judgments of perceptual averages to be open to priming effects. 
After all, Dormal and Pesenti (2007) found a direct effect of 
numerosity on perceived length. 
The present studies consist of five experiments focusing on 
people’s judgments of the average sizes of sets of squares. 
Experiment 1 was the first strong test for a sample size bias for 
perceptual judgments of averages. The results of the study by 
Price et al. (2006), in which people judged the average heights 
of stick figures, was somewhat ambiguous because people might 
have interpreted the stick figures as representations of real people 
and based their judgments on their general knowledge about 
people’s heights. In the first experiment, our approach was to 
present participants with sets of three, six, nine, and 12 squares 
and to ask them to rate the average size of the squares in each 
set. Then, in the next four experiments, we tested potential 
moderators of the sample size bias. In Experiment 2, we 
changed the response to an estimate of the area of the average 
square in terms of a standard unit of area. More important, we 
varied whether the size of the squares in each sample varied or 
was constant. Again, this is a way to test the idea that the sample 
size bias occurs because people focus on the most extreme 
individual stimuli when judging averages. In Experiment 3, we 
presented the squares in each set sequentially rather than 
simultaneously as a way of showing that it is the sample size rather 
than the spatial distribution of the squares that matters. In 
Experiments 4 and 5, we changed the response mode again to be 
more similar to previous research on perceptual averaging. 
Participants indicated whether the average square in a set or 
an individual comparison square was larger (Experiment 4) or 
smaller (Experiment 5). These studies were meant to test the 
possibility that the sample size bias is limited to quantitative 
judgments made on a numeric scale. Remarkably, the sample 




The primary purpose of Experiment 1 was to test for the sample 
size bias in judgments of perceptual averages. The stimuli were 
squares presented on a computer screen, and the response was a 
rating of the average size of the squares. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 35 undergraduate students 
(31 women and four men) at California State University, 
Fresno, who participated in this experiment as part of an 
introductory psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were 24 sets of gray squares presented on a 
white background. These sets varied in both sample size (3, 6, 9, and 
12) and in average square size (small and large). In the small-square 
sets, there were equal numbers of squares that were 5, 11, and 17 mm 
on a side for a mean area of 145.00 mm2. In the large-square sets, 
there were equal numbers of squares that were 13, 19, and 25 mm on 
a side for a mean area of 385.00 mm2. For each combination of 
sample size and average square size, there were three sets of squares 
in different quasirandom spatial arrangements. Specifically, the 
squares were organized within a 12 X 8 cm rectangular area. For 
samples of size 3, three of the four corners of the rectangular area 
contained a square. For samples of size 6, 9, and 12, all four corners 
of the rectangular area contained a square and the remaining squares 
were distributed throughout the remaining space. This served as a 
partial control for the envelope area of the squares—the smallest 
polygon that contains all the squares. 
Design and procedure. Participants were tested individually 
using desktop computers. All responses were size judgments made 
by using the mouse to click on one of the integers from 1 to 10 that 
were arrayed horizontally across the bottom of the screen. Anchor 
labels consisted of a small square (3 mm on a side) centered 
beneath the 1 at the left end of the scale and a large square (27 mm 
on a side) centered beneath the 10 at the right end of the scale. To 
ensure that participants were familiar with the rating scale, they 
were first presented with 13 individual squares ranging in size 
from 3 mm on a side to 27 mm on a side—in a random order—and 
judged the size of each one by clicking on a numeral on the rating 
scale. They made each of these judgments at their own pace while 
the stimulus square remained displayed on the screen. The main 
task was then explained to participants as one of using the same 
rating scale to judge the average size of the squares in each of 
several sets. Participants then made average-size judgments for 
two practice sets, had an opportunity to ask questions, and finally 
made average-size judgments for the 24 stimulus sets. Again, they 
made each of these judgments at their own pace while the stimulus 
set remained displayed on the screen, and no feedback was 
presented to them at any time about the accuracy of their 
judgments. The 24 stimulus sets were presented in a different 
random order for each participant, with the constraint that each 
block of eight trials contained one set with each combination of 
sample size and average square size. 
 
Results and Discussion 
For each participant, we computed the mean judgment for 
each combination of sample size and average square size. 
Figure 1 presents the means and standard errors of these mean 
judgments and shows a clear sample size bias, with the 
judgments increasing as a function of the sample size. To 
confirm this statistically, we submitted the mean judgments to 
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Figure 1. Means and standard errors of participants’ judgments of aver- 




analysis of variance (ANOVA).1 Not surprisingly, there was a 
main effect of average square size, which simply shows that 
participants distinguished the small-square sets from the large- 
square sets, F(1, 34) = 302.44, p < .001, partial 112 = .90. Most 
important for present purposes, there was a linear effect of 
sample size, F(1, 34) = 63.66, p < .001, partial 112 = .65. There 
was also an unexpected interaction between these two factors, 
with the linear effect of sample size being somewhat stronger 
for the large-square sets, F(1, 34) = 15.03, p < .001, partial 
112 = .31. 
As a slightly different way of looking at these results, we 
regressed each participant’s average size judgments onto the 
sample size to obtain both unstandardized and standardized 
regression slopes for each participant, where a positive slope 
indicates a sample size bias. The mean unstandardized 
regression slope was 
0.14 (SD = 0.11), which is significantly greater than zero, t(34) = 
7.98, p < .001, d = 1.35. This indicates that, on average, when the 
sample size increased by one square, the judged average size 
increased by 0.14 units on the 1-to-10 rating scale. The mean 
standardized slope was 0.25 (SD = 0.15). This indicates that, on 
average, when the sample size increased by one square, the judged 
average size increased by 0.25 standard deviations. Perhaps more 




The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with previous re- 
search on the sample size bias and suggest that judgments of 
perceptual averages are biased by sample size just as judgments of 
conceptual and numerical averages are. In Experiment 2 we 
replicated this result while changing two important aspects of 
the design and procedure. The first is that we changed the 
response to be an estimate of area in terms of a standard unit that 
we provided (a purple circle that we defined as having an area of 
one unit). The second is that we manipulated whether the squares 
in each sample 
varied in size or were all the same size as a way of testing the idea 
that the sample size bias requires selective attention to or selective 
weighting of more extreme individual stimuli. Recall that Price et 
al. (2006) observed a sample size bias in a study in which some of 
the sets consisted of identical stick figures and participants judged 
the average height of the stick figures. At first, this seems 
inconsistent with a selective attention explanation because there 
were no extreme individuals to selectively attend to. But, again, 
it is possible that participants interpreted the stick figures as 
representations of real people. A group of 10 stick figures might 
have prompted them to imagine a group of 10 real people—in 
which case they could still selectively attend to the taller imagined 
people or weight them more heavily in their judgments. The 
present study addresses this issue because it is clear to 
participants that they are judging the average size of the very 
squares they are looking at. Because all the squares are exactly 
the same size, there can be no selective attention to or selective 
weighting of larger squares. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 25 undergraduate students 
(20 women and five men) at California State University, 
Fresno, who participated in this experiment as part of an 
introductory psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli. The primary stimuli were 48 sets of black squares 
presented on a white background. The sets varied in terms of the 
sample size (3, 6, 9, and 12), the average square size (small and 
large), and the variability of the squares (variable or non-
variable). In the small-square variable sets, there were equal 
numbers of squares that were 5, 11, and 17 mm on a side for a 
mean area of 
145.00 mm2. In the large-square variable sets, there were equal 
numbers of squares that were 13, 19, and 25 mm on a side for a 
mean area of 385.00 mm2. In the small-square non-variable sets, 
the squares were all 11 mm on a side for a mean area of 121.00 
mm2. In the large-square non-variable sets, the squares were all 19 
mm on a side for a mean area of 361.00 mm2. For each 
combination of sample size, average square size, and variability, 
there were three sets in three different quasi-random 
arrangements in which each square was approximately 1 to 2 
cm from its nearest neighbors. (We made no attempt to control 
the envelope area of the squares in this experiment.) In addition, 
a purple circle 6 mm in diameter (28.27 mm2) appeared in the 
upper left corner of the screen throughout the experiment and 
was said to represent one unit of area. 
Design and procedure.   Participants were tested individually 
using desktop computers. They began by reading a detailed set of 
instructions that described their task in a general way and 
explained how to make area judgments in terms of the standard 
unit of area. Specifically, it was explained that the purple circle 
covered one unit of area on the screen, and an example was 
presented to show that a square that covered the same amount of 
area as three purples circles would have an area of three units. 
Another example was  presented  to  show  how  the  areas  of  
four  different  sized squares could be combined mathematically 
to find the average 
 
 
1 In reporting our ANOVA results, we focus on the linear effect of 
sample size. Results pertaining to the quadratic and cubic effects for all 
experiments are presented in the Appendix. The only one of these effects 



































(arithmetic mean) area of the squares. The instructions then ex- 
plained that the participants’ goal was not to compute the average 
area precisely, but to make an intuitive estimate of the average area
 16
 
in no more than about 10 s (although no time limit was actually 14 
enforced). The instructions also explained that participants’ judg- 
ments would be limited to the integers from 1 to 20 because all of 12 
the averages were within this range. 10 
After making three practice judgments and having an opportunity to 
ask questions, participants saw the 48 sets of squares in a 8 
random order and estimated the average area of each set by typing 6 
an integer from 1 to 20. They made these judgments at their own 
pace while the stimulus sets remained displayed on the screen, and 4 
they received no feedback about their accuracy. 2 
Variable Sets 
 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 presents the means and standard errors of participants’ 
estimates of average square area as a function of sample size, 
square size, and square variability. The figure shows a clear 
sample size bias under all conditions. To confirm this statistically, 
we computed the mean estimate for each of the 16 combinations of 
sample size, average square size, and square variability for each 
participant. Then we submitted these mean estimates to a 4 
(sample size) X 2 (square size) X 2 (square variability) repeated- 
measures ANOVA. As in Experiment 1, there was a main effect of 
square size, which shows that participants reliably distinguished 
the small-square sets from the large-square sets, F(1, 24) = 53.47, 
p < .001, partial 112 = .69. There was no main effect of square 
variability, F(1, 24) = 0.90, p = .77, partial 112 = .004, which 
shows that participants did not distinguish the variable sets from 
the non-variable sets (even though there was actually a small 
difference in their mean areas). Most important for present 
purposes, there was a linear effect of sample size, F(1, 24) = 
11.44, p = .002, partial 112 = .32. Unlike in Experiment 1, in 
this experiment there was no interaction between sample size and 
average square size, F(1, 24) = 0.26, p = .62, partial 112 = .01. 
There was also no interaction between sample size and square 
variability, F(1, 24) = 0.02, p = .90 partial 112 = .001. This is 
particularly important theoretically because it confirms that the 
sample size bias does not depend on there being variability among 
the individual items (see also Price et al., 2006). This, in turn, 
provides evidence against the idea that the sample size bias 
depends on selective attention to or weighting of the most 
extreme stimuli in the set. Finally, there was no interaction 
between aver- age square size and variability, F(1, 24) = 0.33, 
p = .57, partial 112 = .014, nor was there a three-way interaction 
among the linear effect of sample size, average square size, and 
square variability, F(1, 24) = 0.59, p = .45, partial 112  = .024. 
The nature of the response scale in this experiment makes it 
possible to examine the accuracy of participants’ estimates of 
average area. The dotted lines in Figure 2 show the objectively 
correct areas for the small-square sets and large-square sets in 
terms of the standard unit of area that participants used. For the 
small-square sets, the mean response is a slight underestimate of 
the objective value for samples of three squares, a slight 
overestimate for samples of six squares, and then an increasingly 
greater overestimate as the sample size increases to nine and 12 
squares. For the large-square sets, the mean response is a 
substantial underestimate for samples of three squares and then 
a smaller underestimate 
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Figure 2. Means and standard errors of participants’ estimates of average 
square area separately by sample size, average square size, and square 
variability in Experiment 2. The judgments were made in terms of a 
standard unit of area represented by a circle with an area of 28.27 mm2. The 
dotted horizontal lines represent what would be objectively correct 
judgments of area in terms of the standard unit. 
 
 
 as sample size increases to six, nine, and 12 squares. These 
results illustrate that there is no fixed relationship between sample 
size and accuracy. 
Finally, we also regressed each participant’s average size 
estimates onto the sample size to obtain both an unstandardized 
regression slope and a standardized regression slope for each 
participant—where a positive slope indicates sample size bias. The 
mean unstandardized regression slope was 0.30 (SD = 0.44), 
which was significantly greater than zero, t(24) = 3.37, p = .002, 
d = 0.66. This indicates that, on average, when the sample size 
increased by one square, the estimated average area of the squares 
increased by 0.29 units of area (8.20 mm2). The mean standardized 
regression slope was 0.29 (SD = 0.27). This indicates that, on 
average, when the sample size increased by one standard devia- 
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tion, the estimated average area of the squares increased by 0.29 
standard deviations. Note that the standardized regression 
coefficients can be directly compared across Experiments 1 and 
2 and indicate a similarly strong sample size bias. It is also worth 




Experiment 3 was essentially a replication of the variable- 
squares condition of Experiment 2 with one very important 
difference. The squares in each set were presented sequentially 
rather than simultaneously and the estimates of average area 
were made immediately after all the squares in the set had 
been presented. Previous research on the sample size bias has 
demonstrated it under sequential presentation conditions (Price, 
2001; Smith & Price, 2010), which strongly suggests that we 
should observe it here as well. Most important, sequential 
presentation controls for the spatial distribution of the squares. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, the more squares there were in a set, the 
more total area those squares covered and the larger the 
envelope area of those squares was. Thus, it is possible that 
either the total area or the envelope area—rather than the sample 
size—was what is driving the sample size bias. But a sample size 




Participants. The participants were 21 undergraduate 
students (15 women and six men) at California State 
University, Fresno, who participated as part of an introductory 
psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli, design, and procedure. The design and procedure 
were essentially the same as for Experiment 2. However, only the 
variable sets of squares were used and the squares in each set 
appeared one at a time in a random order in the center of the 
screen. Each square appeared for 1,000 ms with a 500-ms interval 
between squares. Immediately after the last square in the sample 
was presented, participants were prompted to enter their average 
area estimate, which again they did at their own pace. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 presents the means and standard errors of participants’ 
estimates of average square area as a function of sample size and 
average square size. Again, there was a main effect of average 
square size, which simply shows that participants distinguished the 
small-square sets from the large-square sets, F(1, 20) = 17.66, p < 
.001, partial 112 = .47. Most important for present purposes, there 
was also a linear effect of sample size, F(1, 20) = 21.02, p < .001, 
partial 112 = .51. There was no interaction between sample size and 
average square size, F(1, 20) = 2.55, p = .13, partial 112 = .11. In 
terms of accuracy of participants’ estimates, the pattern was 
similar to that from Experiment 2. 
Again, we also regressed each participant’s average-area 
estimates onto the sample size to obtain both an unstandardized 
regression slope and a standardized regression slope for each 
participant. The mean unstandardized regression slope was 0.38 
(SD = 0.38), which was significantly greater than zero, t(20) = 
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Figure 3. Means and standard errors of participants’ estimates of average 
square area separately by sample size and average square size in 
Experiment 3. The squares in each set were presented sequentially and 
judgments were made in terms of a standard unit of area represented by a 
circle with an area of 28.27 mm2. The dotted horizontal lines represent 




4.58, p < .001, d = 1.00. This indicates that, on average, when the 
sample size increased by one square the estimated average area of 
the squares increased by 0.38 units (10.75 mm2). The mean 
standardized regression slope was 0.37 (SD = 0.28). This 
indicates that, on average, when the sample size increased by 
one standard deviation, the estimated average area of the squares 
increased by 
0.37 standard deviations—a slightly stronger effect than in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, 19 of the 21 participants 
(90%) had positive slopes. 
Again, the sequential presentation of the squares in 
Experiment 3 rules out the possibility that either the total area 
of the squares or the envelope area of the squares—as opposed 
to the number of squares—is what is driving the sample size 
bias. Of course, the design used in Experiment 3 introduces a 
new confounding variable—the total amount of time it takes to 
present the squares in a set. So it is possible that total 
presentation time is driving the sample size bias here. But this 
alter- native explanation has two difficulties. One is that, in 
their experiments on number averaging, Smith and Price 
(2010) observed the sample size bias even in a sequential-
presentation condition in which total presentation time was 
controlled by varying the time between stimulus numbers 
within a set. The second is that it is more parsimonious to 
assume that the sample size bias is driven by sample size for 
both simultaneous and sequential presentation rather than 
being driven by total area or envelope area for simultaneous 
presentation and by total duration for sequential presentation. 
 
Experiments 4 and 5 
In Experiments 4 and 5 we addressed the question of whether 
there is a sample size bias in comparative judgments of size. This 
is important because all of our previous research on the sample 
 


















size bias has focused on ratings and estimates, while research on 
perceptual averaging has tended to focus on comparative 
judgments (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2005). This 
leaves open the possibility that the sample size bias is introduced 
only at the point of generating a quantitative response on a 
numeric scale. The internal representation of average might 
remain unaffected. In Experiment 4, we tested for this possibility 
by asking participants on each trial to compare a set of squares 
with an individual comparison square and choose which was 
larger: the average of the set of squares or the comparison 
square. Note, however, that a tendency to choose the average of 
the set could indicate that that sample size is affecting the 
representation of the average, but it could also indicate a simpler 
bias toward choosing physically larger stimuli over physically 
smaller stimuli (Silvera, Josephs, & Giesler, 2002). In 
Experiment 5, therefore, we asked participants to choose which 
was smaller: the average of the set of squares or the comparison 
square. Here the sample size bias should be reflected in a 
tendency to choose the comparison square, which would rule 
out the possibility that participants are simply choosing the 
physically larger stimulus. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 110 undergraduate 
students at Appalachian State University, who participated in 
this experiment as part of an introductory psychology course 
requirement. There were 58 in Experiment 4 and 52 in 
Experiment 5. 
Stimuli. The primary stimuli were sets of black squares on a 
white background, which varied in terms of their sample size (3, 6, 
9, 12, and 15). Each set contained an equal number of squares that 
were 9.09, 11.69, and 14.29 mm on a side for a mean area of 
141.16 mm2. The squares in each set were presented 
simultaneously in the upper two-thirds of the screen and their 
positions were determined quasirandomly on each trial, with the 
constraint that no squares could overlap. 
Design and procedure. Participants were tested individually 
using desktop computers. On the first trial of the experiment, they 
were presented with a sample of nine squares. At the same time, 
six individual squares ranging from 7.79 mm to 16.89 mm on a 
screen until participants responded by clicking on one of the two 
buttons. 
Fifteen of these 19 trials were critical trials on which each of the 
five sample sizes (3, 6, 9, 12, and 15) appeared three times each 
and the comparison square was the one that participants had 
selected on the first trial. The other four trials were filler trials. For 
two of the filler trials, the sample sizes were 3 and 15 and the 
comparison square was 7.79 mm on a side (slightly smaller than 
the smallest square in the sample). For the other two filler trials, 
the sample sizes were 6 and 12 and the comparison square was 
16.89 mm on a side (slightly larger than the largest square in the 
sample). The presentation order of these 19 trials (15 critical and 
four filler) was determined randomly for each participant. 
 
Results and Discussion 
First, it is worth noting that participants made the correct choice 
on 97% of the filler trials in Experiment 4 and 98% of the filler 
trials in Experiment 5, indicating that they understood their task 
and could almost always make the correct choice when it was 
fairly obvious. 
For each participant, we computed the percentage of critical 
trials on which he or she indicated that the average of the set of 
squares was larger than the comparison square (Experiment 4) or, 
analogously, that the comparison square was smaller than the 
average of the set of squares (Experiment 5). Figure 4 presents the 
means and standard errors of these percentages and again we see 
a clear sample size bias. We then analyzed these results separately 
for the two experiments. In Experiment 4, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the percentages showed a linear effect of sample size, 
F(1, 57) = 38.06, p < .001, partial 112 = .40. As the sample size 
increased, participants were more likely to choose the average of 
the set as being larger than the individual comparison square. The 
mean of the unstandardized regression slopes was 0.03 (SD = 
0.04), which was significantly greater than zero, t(57) = 6.18, p < 
.001, d = 0.81. The mean of the standardized regression slopes 
was 0.41 (SD = 0.51). Of the 58 participants, 43 (74%) had 
positive slopes, while 11 (19%) had negative slopes. 
In Experiment 5, there was also a linear effect of sample size, 
2 
side were arrayed from left to right across the bottom of the screen. F(1, 51) = 4.16, p < .05, partial 11 = .08. In other words, as the 
Participants were instructed to select the individual square from 
this array that was closest to the average size of the sample of nine 
squares. Unknown to the participants, this established a 
comparison square to be used in the rest of the experiment.2 
Next came 19 trials on which a set of squares and a comparison 
square were presented simultaneously, and participants were asked 
to make their comparative judgments. In Experiment 4 they were 
asked to indicate which was larger: the average of the set of 
squares or the comparison square. In Experiment 5 they were 
asked to indicate which was smaller: the average of the set of 
squares or the comparison square. The set of squares appeared 
within the top two thirds of the screen and the individual compar- 
sample  size  increased,  participants  were  again  more  likely  to 
perceive the average of the set to be larger as indicated by their 
being more likely to choose the comparison square as smaller. The 
mean of the unstandardized regression slopes was 0.01 (SD = 
0.03), which was significantly greater than zero, t(51) = 2.03, p < 
.05, d = 0.28. The mean of the standardized regression slopes was 
0.18 (SD = 0.53). Of the 52 participants, 29 (56%) had positive 
slopes while 15 (29%) had negative slopes. 
Given that these two experiments were conducted in the same 
lab within a few months of each other, it also made sense to 
compare them directly to see if there were any differences. To do 
so,  we  conducted  a  5  (sample  size)  X 2  (question:  larger  vs.
ison square was centered within the bottom third. A horizontal    
band separated the set of squares and the comparison square and 
contained both the judgment prompt (“Which is larger/smaller, the 
size of the average square in the group above or the square 
below?”) and two buttons (one that said “Average of Group” and 
one that said “Individual Square”). These stimuli remained on the 
2 In a pilot study, we provided the comparison square instead of letting 
participants choose it. The problem with this approach was that some 
participants always perceived the comparison square to be smaller than the 
average of the set while others always perceived it to be larger. Thus, it was 





































3 6 9 12 15 
Sample Size 
more squares there were in a set, the greater people judged their 
average size to be. Furthermore, this effect occurred across a wide 
range of conditions. It occurred when the squares in each set were 
presented simultaneously and also when they were presented 
sequentially. It occurred when the squares in the sets varied in 
size and also when they were all the same size. It occurred 
when the judgments were ratings or estimates of the average size 
of a set of squares and also when they involved comparisons of 
the average size of a set of squares to the size of an individual 
comparison square. And for the comparisons, it occurred when 
participants had to indicate whether the average of the set or the 
comparison square was larger and also when they had to indicate 
whether the average of the set or the comparison square was 
smaller. 
The robustness of the sample size bias is even more impressive 
when one takes into account that it has already been demonstrated 
when people judge the average risk of groups of people—whether 
the people are represented by written descriptions presented 
sequentially, photographs of real people presented 
simultaneously, 
or even identical stick figures (Price, 2001; Price et al., 2006). And 
Figure 4.   Means and standard errors of the proportion of trials on which 
participants indicated that the average of a set of squares was larger than an 
individual comparison square (Experiment 4; solid line) or that an 
individual comparison square was smaller than the average of ament 5; 
dashed line), separately by sample size. 
 
smaller) ANOVA. Of course, this revealed a significant linear 
effect of sample size, F(1, 108) = 33.55, p < .001, partial 112  = 
.24. There was no main effect of question, F(1, 108) = 0.87, p = 
.35, partial 112 = .008, but there was an interaction, with the linear 
effect of sample size being stronger in the larger-question 
condition, F(1, 108) = 8.56, p = .004, partial 112 = .07. One 
possible explanation of this difference is that it reflects another 
effect that operates independently—and in the opposite 
direction— of the sample size bias. One possibility is the 
aforementioned tendency for people to prefer larger stimuli over 
smaller ones (Silvera et al., 2002). Thus, when choosing whether 
the average of a set of squares or an individual comparison 
square is larger, both the sample size bias and the preference 
for larger stimuli would make them more likely to choose the set 
as the sample size increases. But when choosing whether the 
average of a set of squares or an individual comparison square 
is smaller, the sample size bias would lead them to choose the 
individual square as the sample size increases, but the preference 
for larger stimuli would lead them to choose the set as the sample 
size increases. This would result in a weakened overall sample 
size bias. 
Nevertheless, the results of Experiments 4 and 5 show that the 
sample size bias does extend to comparative judgments of size. 
These results are also consistent with the idea that sample size 
affects the internal representation of the average. It is not simply a 
response bias that occurs when people make a quantitative 
judgment on a numeric scale, nor is it simply a response bias 






In this series of five experiments, we demonstrated a sample size 
bias on people’s judgments of the average size of squares; the 
it has been demonstrated when people quickly estimate the mean 
of sets of numbers presented simultaneously or sequentially (Smith 
& Price, 2010). Across all of these studies, the sample size bias has 
been strong and consistent, with the vast majority of participants 
exhibiting an effect in the expected direction. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
As we argued in the introduction, the robustness of the sample 
size bias casts doubt on many plausible explanations that can 
account for it under some conditions but not others—and the 
present results continue this trend. For example, the nature of the 
task—judging average size— casts doubt on the idea that 
participants fundamentally misunderstand what they are 
supposed to do (e.g., summing rather averaging). The sample size 
bias for sequentially presented stimuli (Experiment 3) casts doubt 
on the idea that the effect is driven by the spatial distribution of 
the items in a set (as opposed to the number of items). The 
sample size bias for non-variable sets (Experiment 2) casts 
doubt on the idea that participants’ judgments of average are 
based primarily on the most extreme stimuli in a set. The 
sample size bias for comparative judgments (Experiment 4) 
casts doubt on the idea that it only affects quantitative 
judgments on a numeric scale, and the sample size bias for 
comparisons in terms of smallness (Experiment 5) casts doubt 
on the idea that people are simply more likely to choose 
larger samples. 
Yet another explanation that the present results cast doubt on is 
that people’s judgments increase as a function of their response 
time. Although response times in the present experiments are 
difficult to interpret because participants were free to respond at 
their own pace, they still provide some insight into this issue. First, 
the mean response time generally did increase as a function of 
sample size in the present experiments. However, unlike the 
sample size bias itself, this result is not a strong one at the 
level of individual participants. For example, in Experiment 1 
there were 18 participants who exhibited positive correlations 
between sample size and response time, but there were 17 
participants who exhibited negative correlations. Recall also that 
every participant in Experiment 1 exhibited a positive 
correlation between sample size and judged average size. In 




was observed among participants who took more time to respond 
to larger samples and also among people who took less time to 
respond to larger samples. Although there is certainly more that 
can be learned about judgments of averages from response times in 
experiments designed specifically for that purpose, the present 
results suggest that the sample size bias is not closely related to 
them. 
We believe that all of the present results are consistent with the 
theory we described in the introduction—that the sample size bias 
is a priming effect. Specifically, it seems likely that the sample size 
activates an internal representation of relative quantity or 
magnitude that directly affects the internal representation of the 
average and therefore affects the judgment of average. In 
addition to accounting for the robustness of the results, this 
theory is consistent with research showing that stimulus 
numerosity and frequency do seem to activate internal 
representations of magnitude (e.g., Dehaene, 2011; Dormal & 
Pesenti, 2009; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004) and that 
irrelevant numerosities and frequencies do affect subsequent 
quantitative judgments (Dormal & Pesenti, 2007; Friedenberg & 
Limratana, 2005; Pelham et al., 1994). 
Although our research has focused exclusively on judgments of 
average—this priming theory implies that the judgment does not 
have to be about an average. So, for example, the number of 
squares in a set should also affect judgments about the size of any 
individual square in the set or the total area covered by the squares 
in the set (cf. Pelham et al., 1994). In fact, from the priming 
perspective, the number of items in a set should affect judgments 
about entirely different stimuli. For example, if participants were 
exposed to different numbers of squares while estimating 
quantities like the length of the Mississippi River or the high 
temperature in Honolulu, the number of squares should affect 
these judgments too. Of course, there would have to be 
boundary conditions on these effects. Among them are that the 
sample size might require some minimal level of cognitive 
processing and the judgment might have to be made 
simultaneously with the presentation of the set or immediately 
afterward (cf. Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Another 
potential boundary condition is that there might have to be a 
certain amount of uncertainty associated with the judgment. 
Clearly there is some uncertainty in judging average risk, number, 
and size. But what if people were to judge the average length of a 
set of yard sticks or the average weight of a set of 16-pound 
bowling balls? Here it seems likely that knowledge about the 
items being judged—along with their conceptual under- standing 
of averages—would lead them to the same (correct) answer 
regardless of the sample size. 
Yet another factor that might moderate the sample size bias is 
whether sample size is varied within subject—as in all of our 
research to date— or between subjects. On the one hand, a within- 
subject design calls attention to the changing sample sizes, which 
may be important for producing the effect. In fact, research on the 
response of the intraparietal sulcus to the presentation of sets of 
stimuli shows habituation when the same number of items is 
presented repeatedly and renewed activation when there is a 
change in this number (Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004). 
For this reason, in a between-subjects design— or even a within- 
subject design with the stimuli blocked by sample size—it is 
possible that the sample size bias would be reduced or even 
eliminated. On the other hand, conceptually similar effects studied 
by researchers in judgment and decision making do not seem to 
require within-subject designs. For example, Wilson et al. 
(1996)—in a between-subjects design—found that an arbitrary ID 
number affected participants’ subsequent estimates of the number 
of physicians listed in the telephone directory. Similarly, Oppen- 
heimer, LeBoeuf, and Brewer (2008)—also in a between-subjects 
design—found that copying a set of short or long lines affected 
participants’ subsequent estimates of the length of the Mississippi 
River and the average high temperature in Honolulu. Thus, it 
remains important to study the role of within-subject versus 
between-subjects designs in producing the sample size bias—not 
only because of its theoretical implications but because of its 
implications for understanding when the sample size bias is likely 
to occur outside the laboratory. 
Although we believe that the priming account of the sample size 
bias is highly plausible and leads to many interesting and 
eminently testable predictions, we should emphasize that there are 
still other kinds of accounts that should be explored. One kind is 
that sample size affects some other variable that, in turn, affects 
quantitative judgments. We have already seen that it seems 
unlikely to be the spatial distribution of the stimuli or the time 
it takes to respond to them. But there are still other possibilities. 
For example, making judgments about larger samples might place 
a greater load on working memory, and quantitative judgments 
might increase as a function of working memory load. This idea 
could be tested by having participants make quantitative 
judgments while manipulating the working memory demands of 
a secondary task. Another kind of account is a psychophysical 
one. Perhaps to make their judgments of average, people form 
representations of the dimension under consideration for the 
individual items, mentally sum these representations, and then 
divide this sum by a representation of the sample size. The 
psychophysical function for sample size is almost certainly 
negatively accelerated (e.g., Feigenson et al., 2004; Hintzman, 
1988), which could produce a sample size bias because 
participants would be dividing by a subjective sample size that 
increases too slowly relative to the objective sample size. 
 
Conclusions 
The sample size bias in judgments of averages appears to be an 
extremely robust phenomenon with important theoretical and 
practical implications. Theoretically, it is important now to 
identify the precise mechanism underlying it and to explore how 
it relates to conceptually similar effects from the study of 
quantitative cognition and perception and judgment and 
decision making. Practically, it is also important to study 
whether the sample size bias affects judgments of averages in 
contexts in which they frequently occur. These include 
supervisors’ evaluations of groups of people (e.g., students, 
athletes), patients’ judgments of average symptom frequency or 
severity, physicians’ judgments of average treatment outcome, 
consumers’ estimates of average price, and people’s judgments of 
average completion time for a repeated task. Given the 
robustness of the sample size bias, it seems likely that it will 
turn up in many, if not all, of these domains. 
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Additional Statistical Results: ANOVA Results for Involving Quadratic and Cubic Effects of Sample 
Size for All Experiments 
 
 



























Note.  ANOVA = analysis of variance. 
a “Size” refers to the size of the squares in a set: smaller or larger. b “Var” refers to the variability of the squares 
in a set: variable or nonvariable. c “Experiment” refers to Experiment 4 in which participants were asked 
whether the average of the set or the comparison square was larger or Experiment 5 in which they indicated 













Cubic effect 1, 34 0.83 .37 .024 
Quadratic X Sizea 1, 34 0.74 .40 .021 
Cubic X Size 1, 34 1.38 .25 .039 
Quadratic effect 1, 24 2.75 .11 .103 
Cubic effect 1, 24 0.09 .77 .004 
Quadratic X Size 1, 24 0.12 .73 .005 
Cubic X Size 1, 24 0.22 .64 .009 
Quadratic X Varb 1, 24 0.26 .61 .011 
Cubic X Var 1, 24 0.02 .90 .001 
Quadratic X Area X Var 1, 24 2.51 .13 .095 
Cubic X Area X Var 1, 24 0.29 .59 .012 
Quadratic effect 1, 20 3.12 .09 .135 
Cubic effect 1, 20 1.50 .24 .070 
Quadratic X Size 1, 20 0.74 .40 .036 
Cubic X Size 1, 20 0.00 .97 .000 
Experiment 4     
Quadratic effect 1, 57 2.69 .11 .05 
Cubic effect 1, 57 1.75 .19 .03 
Experiment 5     
Quadratric effect 1, 51 0.70 .41 .01 
Cubic effect 1, 51 1.12 .30 .02 
Experiment 4 and 5 combined     
Quadratic effect 1, 108 0.24 .63 .00 
Cubic effect 1, 108 2.81 .10 .03 
Quadratic X Experimentc 1, 108 2.99 .09 .03 
Cubic X Experiment 1, 108 0.01 .91 .00 
 
